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INTRODUCTION
The decision in Ivers v. Utah Dep 't of Transp, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802,
constitutes a marked departure from Utah's constitutional mandate that "just
compensation" be paid when private property is "taken or damaged." UTAH CONST,
art. I, § 22. The harsh impact of the Ivers decision is that it improperly denies
landowners, like Defendant/Petitioner Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral"), the
opportunity to recover the full measure of "just compensation," as required by Utah's
constitution. In particular, the decision permits private property to be taken, damaged,
and substantially impaired by the government, at the cost of unjustly denying the
landowner the necessary recourse to be made whole for the injury caused by the
government's action. The inequitable result of Ivers is wholly inconsistent and
irreconcilable with Utah's constitutional mandate.
It is undisputed that the 1-15 Project required the physical taking of Admiral's
property and resulted in the substantial diminution of its value—all as a direct result of
UDOT's construction of an elevated highway 28 feet above Admiral's property. (R. at
181, 494-95). After the Ivers decision, Admiral is unable to recover all of the damages
caused by the taking of its property and UDOT's construction of its project. The
practical effect of Ivers is to impute into law precisely the result that the constitutional
framers sought to reject and avoid. Utah's constitution as written clearly mandates that
Admiral must receive "just compensation"—meaning that it must be compensated for
all damages and be placed monetarily in the position it would have been in but-for the
taking. Such a result is just; it is equitable; it is what was intended by the constitutional
-1-

framers; and it is consistent with what the constitution demands. Accordingly, Ivers must
be overruled in order to restore Utah's eminent domain to what was intended by the
constitutional framers and what the constitution clearly requires.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the single issue
of "whether Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007),
should be overruled on constitutional grounds." Order for Supp. Br. and Reh'g (June 23,
2010). In its supplemental response brief, Plaintiff/Respondent Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") has largely ignored the Court's directive and failed to provide
any constitutionally-based rationale for either rejecting the arguments of Admiral or
overruling the Ivers decision on the issue of loss of view. Specifically, UDOT failed to
present any constitutional arguments in response to Admiral's supplemental brief. It also
failed to provide a constitutional basis to support its assertion that the Ivers decision on
loss of view should be overruled.
UDOT also did not comply with the Court's Order in that it did not provide
"supplemental" briefing in support of its argument to overrule Ivers on the issue of loss
of visibility. Instead, UDOT simply cited Utah's prior case law and merely restated,
almost verbatim, the arguments made in its brief to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Having failed to comply with the Court's Order, UDOTs arguments should be
rejected and this Court should overrule Ivers on the issue of loss of visibility and uphold
the decision on loss of view.
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UDOT's arguments should also be rejected on substantive grounds. UDOT's
arguments regarding Ivers are inconsistent with the express language of Utah's
constitution and with the stated intention of the constitutional framers. UDOT's
arguments are also in direct conflict with Utah case law as to what constitutes a "taking"
and the measure of "just compensation" that must be paid when a taking occurs. Under a
correct reading of Utah's constitution and case law, Ivers should be overruled on the
issue of loss of visibility and should be upheld on the issue of loss of view.
ARGUMENT
I.

UDOT's Response Ignores The Court's Directive And Fails To Present Any
Constitutional Analysis Regarding The Ivers Decision.
UDOT's response to Admiral's supplemental brief largely ignores the Supreme

Court's Order requesting additional briefing on the constitutionality of Ivers, UDOT
makes no effort to respond to or address Admiral's arguments regarding the significance
of Utah's constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid when private
property is "taken or damaged'' UTAH CONST, art. I, § 22. ("Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."); City ofHildale v.
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, Tj 18, 28 P.3d 697. In fact, other than its initial citation to Article I,
Section 22 in its section entitled "Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and
Rules" and passing references to the provision in cited cases, UDOT's brief only makes a
single reference to Utah's constitution. Further, UDOT offers absolutely no discussion of
the state's constitutionally-based requirement for just compensation, and makes no
attempt to respond to the cases cited by Admiral, the plain language of Utah's
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constitution, or its extensive legislative history. UDOT's lack of any constitutional
discussion or argument is remarkable in light of the Supreme Court's mandate to the
parties to provide briefing on the constitutionality of the Ivers case.
A.

UDOT Failed To Present Any Argument Or Discussion Regarding The
Express Language Of Utah's Constitution.

In its initial supplemental brief, Admiral focused the majority of its 46-page brief
on the takings provision in Utah's constitution. Admiral detailed the significance of the
inclusion of the term "or damaged" in the constitution, the historical backdrop of Utah's
constitution, the legislative history and stated intention of the constitutional framers, and
the extensive case law throughout Utah's history that has consistently given meaning to
the state's eminent domain provisions. UDOT has made no attempt to respond to any of
the constitutional arguments presented by Admiral and has instead merely restated its
prior arguments, as if they would be given more weight if said a second time.
UDOT ignored the express language of Utah's constitution, which requires an
award of just compensation whenever property is "taken or damaged." UTAH CONST,
art. I, § 22. UDOT also ignored the fact that Utah's eminent domain provision is distinct
from other jurisdictions because it not only provides for the payment of "just
compensation" where private property has been "taken," but it also affords payment of
damages when the property has been "damaged." Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010
UT 37, Tf 13, 235 P.3d 730 ("because the Utah Constitution bounds the ability of the
government not only to 'take[ ],' but also to cdamage[ ],' private property, we have
characterized this state constitutional provision as being broader than its federal
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counterpart.") (omissions in original); Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 11 P. 849,
852 (Utah 1904) (holding that Utah's constitutional guarantee of just compensation is
triggered when there is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys
or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed") (emphasis added).
B.

UDOT Also Ignored Established Utah Case Law Regarding The Stated
Purpose Of Article I, Section 22 And What Constitutes A "Taking"
Under The State's Constitution.

UDOT also failed to address the stated purpose of the constitutional provision,
which "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all whose property
might thereafter be damaged." Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907)
(finding it "manifest" that the landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered
from the government's alteration of the street grade); see also Coalter v. Salt Lake City,
120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) ("Consequential damages to property which are caused by
making public improvements are recoverable under the Constitution of this state ....").
Further, UDOT offered no response or counter to the clear statement under Utah
law that Article I, Section 22 provides a broad definition of what types of governmental
actions constitute a "taking" and require the payment of "just compensation." Strawberry
Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) (explaining that
Article I, Section 22's "expansive language" has been interpreted to encompass "every
species of property which the public needs may require, ... [including] legal and
equitable rights of every description."). See also Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 11
P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904); see State ex rel State Rd. Comm 'n v. District Court, Fourth
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JudicialDist, 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937); Hampton v. State Rd Comm'n, 445 P.2d
708, 711-12 (Utah 1968); Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah
1990). Due to its failure to respond, UDOT has conceded the continuing validity of these
long-standing legal principles.
C.

UDOT Made No Attempt To Respond To The Extensive Legislative
History Behind Article I, Section 22 And The Clearly Stated Intention
Of The Constitutional Framers To Include The Term "Or Damaged"
In The Constitution.

In addition to its failure to address the express language of Utah's constitution and
the case law giving weight and meaning to the provision at issue, UDOT also failed to
respond, address, or even mention the historical background and legislative history of
Article I, Section 22. UDOT also made no response to the detailed history behind Utah's
unique eminent domain provision and the significance of the framers * deliberate
inclusion of the term "or damaged" in the state's constitution. Nor did UDOT attempt to
address the constitutional framers5 insistence that Utah's constitution afford an adequate
and just remedy and compensation for injuries caused to property as a result of public

improvements.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

at

326-37 (Day 22, Mar. 25, 1895) (Addendum Tab E to Admiral's Supp. Br. (Aug. 16,
2010) (the intent of the term "or damaged'' in Utah's constitution was to make clear that
landowners would be compensated for injuries resulting from the construction of public
works projects, including the particular situation discussed during the Convention which
involved the construction of an elevated roadway constructed near, but not on, the
landowner's property that resulted in "the deprivation of light and air" and other
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"necessary inconveniences" including "noise and soot and cinders, and disturbing the
peace and rest of the family").)
UDOT cannot legitimately ignore the extensive legislative history and express
statements of the constitutional framers that a taking does in fact occur when damages
and "inconveniences" result from the construction of an elevated highway on property
other than the landowner's property. The constitutional framers specifically
contemplated that a compensable "taking" would occur in such a situation, and they
drafted Utah's constitution to include the term "or damaged" to ensure that it would.
II.

UDOT Also Does Not, And Cannot, Reconcile The Conflict In Utah Law
Between The Constitutional Mandate To Award Just Compensation When
Property Is Taken Or Damaged And The Holding In Ivers.
Rather than focusing on any constitutionally-based arguments, UDOT argues that

Admiral may not recover damages for loss of visibility on the grounds that there is no
protected interest in the flow of traffic past its property. UDOT Supp. Br. at 8. In
support of its argument, UDOT cites to a handful of cases, including Ivers—the very case
which the Court is considering overturning.
From the outset, the Court should reject UDOT's circular argument that the Ivers
ruling on loss of visibility is unconstitutional based on the Ivers case itself. See UDOT
Supp. Br. at 10-11. UDOT's citation to Ivers for the proposition that Utah has never
recognized a claim for loss of visibility is improper and not logically sound when (1) no
case before Ivers addressed the issue, and (2) this Court is questioning whether Ivers is
constitutional.
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Next, the cases cited by UDOT are inapposite and fail to reconcile the conflict in
Utah's eminent domain law that on one hand requires just compensation when property is
"damaged" or there is "any substantial interference . . . [that] destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any
substantial degree abridged or destroyed" and on the other hand limits the availability of
compensation awards when such damage and interference occurs. Compare UTAH
CONST, art. I, § 22 and Stockdale, 11 P. at 852, with Ivers, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802.
UDOT argues that Admiral may not recover just compensation for the taking and damage
caused to its property unless Admiral has a protected property interest. UDOT Supp. Br.
at 8-14. Specifically, UDOT asserts that Admiral may not recover damages for loss of
visibility because it does not have a protected interest in the flow of traffic past its
property. UDOT's argument fails for several reasons.
First, the suggestion that Admiral is claiming damages for changes in traffic
patterns has no basis, because Admiral makes no claim based on the flow7 or pattern of
traffic. Traffic flows have not increased or decreased, nor has the flow been impeded,
interfered with or changed. Moreover, Admiral has no complaint over any changes in the
route, direction or quantity of traffic resulting from UDOT's highway project. Instead,
Admiral's damages are caused by the lost visibility of and view from its property, which
are the direct result of the construction of an elevated highway and a twenty-eight foot
tall support wall for the highway.
Second, none of the cases cited by UDOT—other than the Ivers case, which is
under constitutional scrutiny by the Court—correlates loss of visibility and view to traffic
-8-

flow. The case of Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, 235 P.3d 730, dealt
with water rights and a landowner's interest in the "level of soil saturation." The case of
Bagfordv. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (1995), dealt with whether oral agreements to
provide garbage collection services constituted legally enforceable rights. Neither case
dealt with traffic flows or loss of visibility.
Additionally, the cases of Robinett v. Price, 14 Utah 512, 280 P. 736 (1929), State
v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276 (1941), and Weber Basin Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Hislop, 12 Utah 2d 64, 362 P.2d 580 (1961), all cited by UDOT, dealt with an
individual's own access to his property and the loss of business due to the rerouting of a
roadway away from the landowner's property. The cases of Utah Rd. Comm 'n v.
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963), and Hampton v. State Rd Comm 'n, 21
Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), dealt with a landowner's loss of access to his
property. Neither the diversion of traffic nor the loss of access are at issue in the present
case. And none of the cases cited by UDOT, including Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. Miya,
526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974), and UtahDep'tofTransp.

v. Harvey Real Estate,

2002 UT 107, % 10, 57 P.3d 1088, dealt with the issue of loss of visibility.
Third, UDOT's argument ignores the wealth of Utah case law that provides that a
'taking" occurs under Utah's eminent domain laws whenever there is "any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or
by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed." Stockdale, 11 P. at 852 (emphasis added). When there is 'any
substantial interference" with the landowner's property that ''destroys or materially
.0.

lessens its value/' or when a landowner's right to the "use and enjoyment" of his property
has "in any substantial degree" been impaired or destroyed—then there is "in fact and in
law, a taking, in the constitutional sense." Id. (emphasis added). And when such a
constitutional "taking" occurs, the landowner is entitled to just compensation "to the
extent of the damages suffered," even in the situation where the title and possession of
the owner remain undisturbed. Id.
Fourth, Utah courts have similarly held that a compensable "taking" occurs when
a landowner establishes that his property has been substantially impaired or damaged as a
"direct and necessary consequence of the construction or operation of a public use,"
thereby entitling the landowner to just compensation. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.
v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244-45 (Utah 1990) (holding that "[t]he diminution of
value and cost of repairs to the mall which [landowner] alleged constitute damages within
the guarantee of article I, section 22."); Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926,
928 (Utah 1974) ("Just compensation is due if the market value of the property has
diminished."). See also Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^j 29 &
n.l 1, 42 P.3d 379 (remanding case for factual determination of whether "the damage was
indeed for a public use and then whether the damage necessarily resulted from that use").
UDOT has made no attempt to reconcile these cases with Ivers.
III.

If The Supreme Court Were To Accept UDOT's Argument, Admiral Would
Be Denied The Full Measure Of Just Compensation Guaranteed By Utah's
Constitution.
The term "just compensation," as it has been interpreted by Utah courts, means

"that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as they would have
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occupied had their property not been taken." State v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah
1957). The constitutional mandate of just compensation derives "as much content from
the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property
law." Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) (quoting
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488? 490 (1973)). In order for compensation to be fair
and just as required by Utah's Constitution, "it must reflect the fair value of the land to
the landowner[,]" and must make the landowner whole in a monetary sense and place
him back in the position he would have occupied were his property not taken and the
government's project not constructed. Friberg, 687 P.2d at 828 (citing Noble, 305 P.2d
at 497).
UDOT's argument that there is no compensable damage for loss of visibility and
view undermines the fundamental concept of just compensation and denies the landowner
the right to be made whole. Under UDOT's argument, a landowner would not be made
whole and would not be placed in as good a position monetarily as he would have
occupied had his property not been involuntarily taken. This is far short of what is
required by Utah's constitution and what constitutes "just compensation" under Utah law.
To properly determine the fair market value of the affected property—and
correspondingly the amount of just compensation owed—requires "that all factors
bearing upon such value that any prudent purchaser would take into account at [the time
of the taking] should be given consideration, including any potential development in the
area reasonably to be expected." Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 347
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1959). See also Morris v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 102 P. 629,
-11-

631 (Utah 1909) (holding that "everything which arises out of the proper construction and
proper operation of the [public improvement] which directly affects the salable value of
the abutting property may ordinarily be considered as elements in assessing damages")
(emphasis added); Carpet Bam v. State, 786 P.2d 770, 773-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(applying before-and-after valuation method as the proper method of determining
damages).
The policy behind a broad interpretation of just compensation awards under a
"taken or damaged" constitutional provision like Utah's is to allow recovery for all
consequential damages caused by public improvements, thereby ensuring that the
"burdens for such damages are distributed among all the taxpayers" where previously
they disproportionately "fell upon those only who sustained the injury." Kimball v. Salt
Lake City, 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907). As recognized in Kimball in 1907, Utah's
constitutional provision "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all
whose property might thereafter be damaged." Id. In Kimball, the court found it
"manifest" that the landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered from the
government's alteration of the street grade. Id. Thus, under Utah's constitution, "the
party whose property is injuriously affected by any change of grade may recover
damages against the [governmental entity] for the diminution of the market value of his
property to the extent that such diminution exceeds the direct benefits derived from the
improvements causing the damage." Id. at 396.

-12-

IV.

The Ivers Ruling On Loss Of View Is Constitutional, And UDOT Has
Provided No Constitutional Basis For Overruling This Court's Decision.
In its supplemental response brief, UDOT argues that the Ivers rule on loss of

view should be overruled. However, it has failed to comply with the Court's Order to
provide "supplemental" briefing on whether Ivers should be overruled on "constitutional"
grounds. Order for Supp. Br. and Reh'g. UDOT has not provided any constitutional
basis for overruling Ivers, as requested by this Court. Nor has UDOT provided any
"supplemental" briefing; it has only quoted Ivers and cases cited therein, as well as the
district court's decision in the present case (see UDOT Supp. Br. at 14-16). In doing so,
it has merely restated its prior argument from its briefing before the Utah Court of
Appeals (compare id. at 17-20 with UDOT Ct. App. Br. at 8-11). Having presented no
constitutional basis for overruling Ivers or any new arguments that have not been
previously made by UDOT, UDOT's arguments should be rejected.
A.

The Supreme Court In Ivers Did Not Err In Its Ruling Allowing
Damages For Loss Of View.

UDOT argues that this Court erred in ruling that a landowner is entitled to
damages for loss of view—regardless of where the view-impairing structure is
constructed—when the property taken is essential to the completion of the project.
UDOT Br. at 14-16. Contrary to UDOT's assertion, the Court's ruling on loss of view
squarely comports with Utah's constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid
for the taking or damage of private property.
Prior to the Court's ruling in Ivers, Utah law permitted the award of severance
damages for loss of view when private property was taken for public purposes and a
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view-impairing structure was built on the property taken. Ivers v. Utah Dep't ofTransp.,
2007 UT 1 9 4 20, 154 P.3d 802, 807 (citing Utah State Rd Comm Jn v. Miya, 526 P.2d
926 (Utah 1974); Utah Dep %t of Tramp, v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107. 57 P.3d
1088 and Utah Dep 7 ofTransp. v. D'Ambriosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987)). The Court
in Ivers saw the inequities of the prior rule which would have denied damages to Ivers
where the structure that blocked Ivers's view was built on property other than the
property taken. Ivers, 2007 UT 19, ^f 17. In rendering its decision, the Court in Ivers
reasoned that "[l]ogically, if the project could not be built without taking the condemned
land, the impairment of view caused by the completion of the project could and would
not have arisen wbut for' the condemnation." Id. at f 21. Thus, in order to provide "the
correct balance between the property owner's rights under constitutional and statutory
law and the state's interest in its ability to improve the highway system without being
exposed to limitless liability," the Court appropriately expanded its prior ruling to allow
for severance damages for loss of view without regard to the location of the viewimpairing structure, where the property taken is essential to the highway project. Id. at
11121-24.
The Court's ruling on loss of view is in complete accord with the constitutional
requirement that just compensation be paid when private property is "taken or damaged."
By affording a landowner to recover damages for impacts caused as a result of the project
being constructed, the Court in Ivers provided for a more appropriate measure of just
compensation that is squarely in line with the cases that hold that a compensable "taking"
occurs when there has been "substantial interference" with or impairment to the
-14-

landowner's property that results in a material decrease in its value or a reduction in the
landowner's ability to use or enjoy it. Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622,
625-27 (Utah 1990). See also Stockdale, 11 P. at 852. The ruling also afforded
landowners a greater opportunity to be "put in as good a position money wise as they
would have occupied had their property not been taken." Friberg, 687 P.2d at 828.
Accordingly, the Ivers decision on loss of view is constitutional, and UDOT has not
provided any compelling argument to the contrary.
B.

Contrary To UDOT's Suggestion, Admiral's Remainder Property Does
Abut The Property Taken By UDOT As Part Of Its 1-15 Project And
The Taking Of Admiral's Property Was An Essential Part Of That
Project.

UDOT next argues that Admiral's property does not abut 1-15 and therefore the
"abutment rule"—as described by UDOT—does not apply to this case. UDOT's
arguments on this issue are identical to those presented to the Utah Court of Appeals.
UDOT has not provided any new or supplemental arguments on this issue.
Additionally, UDOT's assertion that it is irrelevant that UDOT has taken
Admiral's property as part of its 1-15 reconstruction project directly undermines the most
fundamental concepts of Utah's eminent domain laws—the concept of "just
compensation." It is undisputed that Admiral's property was necessary and essential to
UDOT's highway project and that UDOT could not have completed the project without
Admiral's property. Therefore, Admiral is entitled to receive "just compensation,"
meaning that it should be "put in as good a position money wise as they would have
occupied had their property not been taken." Noble, 305 P.2d at 497; Friberg, 687 P.2d
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at 828 ("[t]he constitutional requirement of just compensation derives 'as much content
from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of
property law/ when the State takes private property for the public welfare"9 and that for
compensation to be fair and just as required by Utah's Constitution. uit must reflect the
fair value of the land to the landowner/' and make the landowner whole in a monetary
sense). UDOT's suggestion that Admiral should not receive the full measure of
compensation resulting from UDOFs taking is contrary to the fundamental protections
required under Utah law.
Furthermore, UDOT's argument is factually inaccurate. Admiral's property was
taken as part of the 1-15 project. And while the specific portion of the project constructed
on Admiral's property was the relocation of 500 West, the property taken was used by
UDOT to construct its 1-15 project in the manner it proposed and was an essential part of
the project. Accordingly, Admiral's property does in fact abut the project and UDOT's
argument to the contrary is without factual support.
CONCLUSION
Admiral respectfully request the Court overrule its prior decision in Ivers v. Utah
Department of Transportation, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, and permit damage awards in
condemnation actions for loss of visibility. UDOT has failed to provide any
constitutionally-based argument that such a result is not appropriate or warranted under
Utah's constitution. Additionally, UDOT failed to comply with the Court's Order
requiring "supplemental" briefing. Instead, UDOT cited to prior case law and merely
restated the arguments it previously presented to the Utah Court of Appeals. Having
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failed to comply with the Court's Order, UDOT's arguments should be rejected and this
Court should overrule Ivers on the issue of loss of visibility and uphold the decision on
loss of view.
Additionally, UDOT's arguments should also be rejected on substantive grounds.
UDOT's arguments regarding Ivers are inconsistent with the express language of Utah's
constitution, the stated intention of the constitutional framers, and the wealth of Utah case
law governing when a "taking" occurs and the measure of "just compensation" that must
be paid. Under a correct reading of Utah's constitution and case law, Ivers should be
overruled on the issue of loss of visibility and should be upheld on the issue of loss of
view. By overruling Ivers, the Court will be returning Utah's eminent domain
jurisprudence to its proper and intended course—one that adheres to the clear mandate of
Utah's constitution.
Dated this 29th day of October, 2010.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
REED L. MARTINEAU
D. JASON HAWKINS

Attorftgys for Defendant/Petitioner
Admiral Beverage Corporation
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